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Abstract
Disclosure rules in the United States capital markets were designed to promote fairness among
all participants by providing a transparent system for equal access to information. The interpreta-
tion of information is the foundation of all prudent investment decisions; thus, an efficient capital
market depends on the proper disclosure of information. Hedge funds heavily influence and play
an integral role in the proper functioning of capital markets. For the markets’ benefit, hedge funds
must publicly disclose their investing activity, which consists of long positions, like buying stock
to sell later, and short positions, like short selling.
However, while hedge funds are obligated to disclose their long positions on Form 13F, there
is no equivalent obligation to disclose short positions. Due to this “long-only” disclosure regime,
the publicly available information is distorted and the marketplace lacks full and fair information.
As a result, market participants and regulators are making important decisions based on mislead-
ing information, and the capital markets are left ripe for fraudulent and manipulative practices.
This Article advocates for an expanded disclosure regime that includes the disclosure of both
long and short positions. A balanced disclosure mandate will optimize the functioning of capi-
tal markets by reducing informational asymmetry, fraud, manipulation, and systemic risk while
promoting liquidity, efficiency, accurate pricing, and effective capital allocation.
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Disclosure rules in the United States capital markets were designed to 
promote fairness among all participants by providing a transparent 
system for equal access to information. The interpretation of 
information is the foundation of all prudent investment decisions; 
thus, an efficient capital market depends on the proper disclosure of 
information. Hedge funds heavily influence and play an integral role 
in the proper functioning of capital markets. For the markets’ benefit, 
hedge funds must publicly disclose their investing activity, which 
consists of long positions, like buying stock to sell later, and short 
positions, like short selling. However, while hedge funds are obligated 
to disclose their long positions on Form 13F, there is no equivalent 
obligation to disclose short positions. Due to this “long-only” 
disclosure regime, the publicly available information is distorted and 
the marketplace lacks full and fair information. As a result, market 
participants and regulators are making important decisions based on 
misleading information, and the capital markets are left ripe for 
fraudulent and manipulative practices. This Article advocates for an 
expanded disclosure regime that includes the disclosure of both long 
and short positions. A balanced disclosure mandate will optimize the 
functioning of capital markets by reducing informational asymmetry, 
fraud, manipulation, and systemic risk while promoting liquidity, 
efficiency, accurate pricing, and effective capital allocation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Capital markets have many working parts, all of which play an 
integral role in promoting the market’s efficiency, fairness, and general 
ability to function. In a capital market, companies issue securities in the 
form of stocks and bonds to raise capital to fund their businesses. 
Investors buy and sell those stocks and bonds to generate profit. Long 
position investing, the most fundamental type of investment, occurs when 
an investor buys a security, holds it for a period of time, and then sells it. 
Another type of investment, called short selling, involves borrowing a 
security and subsequently selling it on the open market in the hopes that 
the security’s value declines. If and when the security’s value declines, 
the borrower buys the same security on the open market for the reduced 
price and returns it to the lender, resulting in the borrower profiting on the 
spread between the price at the time the security was borrowed and sold, 
and the price when the security was purchased on the market.1 Short 
selling accounts for over 25% of all capital market trading.2 In a market 
that promotes the free flow of security purchases and sales, both in the 
form of long positions and short positions, the prices of those securities 
will be accurate and capital allocation will be optimized. 
However, markets do not always have accurate pricing and effective 
capital allocation, especially those markets that restrict the free flow of 
transactions. The symptoms of a poorly functioning financial market 
include ineffective price discovery and inadequate liquidity. In times of 
turmoil, like a recession or depression, those symptoms are exacerbated 
to a point where pricing is either inaccurate or nonexistent, and liquidity 
is similarly reduced or nonexistent. Moreover, systemic risk, the risk of 
one isolated negative event causing a chain reaction of negative events 
throughout the market, has the effect of magnifying those already 
exacerbated symptoms, and potentially spreading those symptoms to 
other markets. 
Hedge funds are the most important market participants for 
promoting efficient price discovery and liquidity, as well as reducing 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., Investment Strategies, HEDGE FUND FACTS 
(2009), http://www.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/about-hedge-funds/investment-strategies/ 
[https://perma.cc/8ZJU-79VF]; Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., Setting Policy, HEDGE FUND 
FACTS (2009), http://www.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/setting-policy/ [https://perma.cc/Z 
4FC-4TS4]. 
 2. See Jenny Anderson, A New Wave of Vilifying Short Sellers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
30, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30shorts.html [http://perma.cc/ 
F4PM-HEHB]. 
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systemic risk. As this Article explains, hedge funds constantly trade 
massive amounts of capital with a multitude of counterparties from all 
industries. Hedge funds are notorious for trading in areas that are often 
avoided by other market participants. Short selling is an essential tool 
employed by hedge funds to carry out their strategies. By utilizing short 
selling, hedge funds not only play a key role in maintaining a functional 
market, but also help to revive and restore a market that is not functioning 
optimally. Moreover, a market that restricts hedge funds’ ability to take 
short positions will almost surely suffer from the symptoms of a 
dysfunctional financial system. 
From 2007 till 2009, a credit and liquidity crisis tore through the 
economy, both in the United States and around the globe, resulting in the 
worst economic downturn since the Great Depression.3 Financial 
institutions became insolvent and some even went bankrupt: JPMorgan 
Chase & Co. acquired Bear Stearns in March 2008 at a fraction of its peak 
market cap over the prior year; Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection in September 2008; and Bank of America 
purchased Merrill Lynch & Co. in September 2008, also at a deep 
discount.4 As financial institutions rapidly collapsed, banks grew more 
and more hesitant to lend to one another, the London Interbank Offered 
Rate (“LIBOR”) and Treasury security interest rates spread further apart, 
and risk premiums for debt increased markedly.5 Across the world, market 
liquidity deteriorated precipitously, and in many cases, froze altogether.6 
On July 15, 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”), in an attempt to slow the downward spiral of liquidity, issued 
an emergency order to halt a popular form of short selling—termed 
“naked shorting”—on the stocks of 799 independent financial 
institutions.7 Naked shorting is the practice of selling short a security that 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See id. 
 4. See The Financial Crisis: Full Timeline, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline [http://perma.cc/QW2M-GGR 
D]. 
 5. See Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., Credit Crisis, HEDGE FUND FACTS (2009), 
http://www.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/about-hedge-funds/credit-crisis-2/ [http://perma.c 
c/XB36-5VL2]. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial 
Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press 
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the seller neither owns, borrows, nor even attempts to borrow.8 The SEC 
justified its order by claiming the ban would instill confidence in the 
financial markets9 and would “enhance investor protection.”10 However, 
it is largely undisputed that short selling provides many benefits to the 
markets, most of which are particularly important in times of financial 
distress. 
It was therefore counterintuitive for the SEC to prohibit one of the 
only remaining tools that could mitigate the financial crisis. The SEC’s 
short selling ban was particularly perplexing, given that the SEC has 
historically recognized short selling as a practice that promotes the health 
and efficiency of financial markets.11 In fact, the SEC’s penultimate 
attempt to protect the markets through short selling restrictions resulted 
in a decline in share prices.12 New York hedge fund manager Whitney 
Tilson pronounced the ban a “desperation move” akin to “grasping at 
straws” in the hopes of saving the stocks of major United States financial 
institutions.13 Another hedge fund manager, Jim Chanos, commented that 
“[i]nvestors are best served when they can hear both the reasons to buy 
and the reasons to sell any given security,” and accordingly, “[t]hese 
emergency orders limit the free flow of information and ultimately will 
not work to help the United States maintain the freest, strongest and most 
liquid capital markets in the world.”14 
In one well-regarded empirical study, the stock performances of a 
group of nineteen of the world’s most prominent financial institutions 
(“G19”) were analyzed to determine the efficacy of the SEC’s short 
                                                                                                                 
/2008/2008-211.htm [https://perma.cc/WYX3-WVXT]; ARTURO BRIS, SHORT SELLING 
ACTIVITY IN FINANCIAL STOCKS AND THE SEC JULY 15TH EMERGENCY ORDER 2 (2008). 
 8. Kara Scannell & Jenny Strasburg, SEC Moves to Curb Short-Selling, WALL ST. 
J. (July 16, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121614248005255151 
[http://perma.cc/9XYC-YGJ3]. 
 9. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial 
Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press 
/2008/2008-211.htm [https://perma.cc/WYX3-WVXT]. 
 10. Bris, supra note 7, at 2; see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Enhances 
Investor Protections Against Naked Short Selling (July 15, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/n 
ews/press/2008/2008-143.htm [https://perma.cc/4DUX-YSMJ]. 
 11. See Vikas Bajaj & Graham Bowley, S.E.C. Temporarily Blocks Short Sales of 
Financial Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/busi 
ness/20sec.html [https://perma.cc/TKZ2-P5UJ]. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Scannell & Strasburg, supra note 8. 
 14. Bajaj & Bowley, supra note 11. 
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selling ban.15 The study found that, as a result of the ban, the G19 stocks 
performed significantly worse than comparable stocks in the ban period.16 
The study concluded that the “lower market quality of the G19 stocks 
[was] not caused by short-selling activities”; that “the G19 stocks . . . 
suffered a significant reduction in intra-day return volatility and an 
increase in spreads, which suggests a deterioration of market quality”; and 
that “market efficiency . . . declined overall after the [short selling ban 
became] effective.”17 
This Article argues that the current disclosure regime, particularly as 
it pertains to the disclosure of short positions, perpetuates widespread 
secrecy and misinformation, which ultimately leads to scenarios like the 
SEC’s imprudent short selling ban. Much about short selling, such as the 
volume of short sales, the size of the aggregate short selling exposure, and 
the identity of short sellers remains a mystery due to inadequate disclosure 
mandates. In fact, hedge funds, which are among the most frequent short 
sellers, are only required to publicly disclose their long positions despite 
short positions making up an essential part of their trading.18 
This Article proposes that by expanding the current hedge fund 
public disclosure obligations to include both long positions and short 
positions, much of the opacity and misinformation that is prevalent in the 
market today will be eradicated. By eliminating this uncertainty, market 
participants and regulators will be able to make decisions and act on a 
balanced information set. Hopefully, such a symmetrical underlying 
information set will deter misinformed decision-making, like the SEC’s 
ban on short selling, and instead facilitate the free flow of securities, 
thereby rejuvenating and optimizing the functionality of the financial 
markets. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses hedge funds and 
the ways in which they utilize short selling, and then describes the role of 
disclosure and its application to hedge funds. Part II presents the 
inadequacies of and resultant harms caused by the current disclosure 
regimes. Part III describes the author’s proposal to compel public 
disclosure of short positions in an effort to promote market efficiency, 
price discovery, liquidity, and reduce systemic risk. 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See Bris, supra note 7, at 2. 
 16. See Bris, supra note 7, at 2, 5-6. 
 17. Bris, supra note 7, at 3, 5-6. 
 18. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 13F. 
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I. HEDGE FUNDS AND THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE 
This part begins by introducing hedge funds through the exploration 
of their structures and the ways in which they implement short selling into 
their strategies. This part then examines how disclosure is integral to the 
protection of investors and the financial system, and presents the current 
disclosure mandates applicable to hedge funds in the United States and 
the European Union (“EU”). It concludes by analyzing the effects of the 
EU’s implementation of short position disclosure on the markets. 
A. HEDGE FUNDS 
1. Hedge Fund Primer 
The term “hedge fund” generally refers to a pooled alternative 
investment vehicle that is professionally managed and whose investors 
are of the highest sophistication.19 A hedge fund’s ultimate goal is to 
generate positive returns, limit volatility, and protect its investors’ 
capital.20 Compared to a mutual fund whose investment prospects are 
legally limited to mostly diversified long positions on equities, bonds, and 
cash, a hedge fund can trade derivatives, utilize leverage, invest in illiquid 
assets, concentrate its investment portfolio, and take on much more risk 
through both long and short positions.21 Historical hedge fund 
performance has shown that hedge funds are particularly stable during 
market downturns, as witnessed during the 2008 United States financial 
crisis when hedge fund losses were less than half of those suffered by the 
market as a whole.22 The size of the hedge fund industry is enormous, 
with over ten thousand active hedge funds collectively managing in 
excess of $3 trillion in assets.23 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See COAL. OF PRIVATE INV. COS., THE BASICS OF HEDGE FUNDS (2009), http:// 
www.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/The_Basics.pdf [http://per 
ma.cc/UJ4J-UX2G]. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., Benefits, HEDGE FUND FACTS (2009), http://www.hed 
gefundfacts.org/hedge/about-hedge-funds/benefits/ [http://perma.cc/7CQ7-3247]. 
 22. See COAL. OF PRIVATE INV. COS., FACTS ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS (2009), http:// 
www.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Facts.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/7YC3-47A2]. 
 23. Luther R. Ashworth II, Is Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary to 
Accomplish the Goals of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Title IV?, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 651, 
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The hedge fund adviser and the investors are the two main parties in 
the hedge fund structure.24 The adviser is responsible for developing 
investment strategies, managing the fund’s portfolio holdings, as well as 
making day-to-day decisions about the fund’s operations.25 Although 
compensation structures may vary from fund to fund, the adviser is 
typically compensated through two fees: the assets under management fee 
and the performance fee.26 The most common fee structure is the “2 and 
20,” whereby an adviser is compensated with 2% of the dollar amount of 
assets that the fund is managing, as well as 20% of the overall profit in a 
given term.27 Performance fees are well-regarded in the industry because 
the adviser only receives compensation if the fund makes a profit; 
accordingly, the interests of the adviser and the investor are aligned.28 
The type of person or entity that can invest in hedge funds is 
restricted primarily by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”), 
which requires registration of investment companies unless the fund 
qualifies for an exemption.29 Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the ICA 
provide for exemptions from registration so long as the fund’s investors 
are from the United States and are either “accredited investors” or 
“qualified purchasers,” respectively.30 To qualify for registration 
exemption under Section 3(c)(1), the fund can sell its shares only 
privately and to no more than 100 investors. Nevertheless, the fund may 
still qualify for the exemption if it sells its shares to more than 100 
investors, so long as those investors are deemed accredited investors, 
which include institutional investors, such as banks, pension funds, and 
                                                                                                                 
657 (2013); Al Lewis, The Systemic Risk of Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2014, 
8:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023036268045795056736484 
22470 [http://perma.cc/P476-TBGT]. 
 24. See Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., Structure, HEDGE FUND FACTS (2009), 
http://www.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/about-hedge-funds/structure/ [http://perma.cc/D7 
N5-XBXC] for an elaboration on the operational structure of a hedge fund. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Hedge Fund Advisor, MANAGED FUNDS ASSOCIATION (2016), 
https://www.managedfunds.org/hedge-fund-investors/faqs/hedge-fund-advisor/ [http://p 
erma.cc/D7N5-XBXC]. 
 27. See id.; Two and Twenty, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/t 
wo_and_twenty.asp [https://perma.cc/68YF-ZQ6H] (last visited May 21, 2017). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(1), (7); MANAGED FUNDS ASSOCIATION, supra note 
26. 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7). 
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endowments, as well as individual persons who have a net worth of at 
least $1 million or individual income exceeding $200,000 or joint income 
exceeding $300,000 in each of the prior two years.31 Alternatively, to 
qualify for registration exemption under Section 3(c)(7), the fund can sell 
its shares only privately, and each investor in the fund, at the time the 
shares were acquired, must be a qualified purchaser, which includes 
certain family owned companies, qualifying trusts, institutional investors, 
as well as any natural person who owns, together with their spouse, at 
least $5 million in investments.32 
Generally, hedge funds adhere strictly to the investor limitations 
because there are a multitude of additional burdens if registration under 
the ICA is triggered. This results in a significant reduction in the 
prospective overall investor pool. For example, only about 8.5% of 
households in the United States qualify to invest in hedge funds.33 More 
than 70% of a hedge fund’s investors are made up of funds of hedge 
funds,34 private and public pension funds, endowment plans, and family 
offices.35 
Despite these investor limitations, hedge funds provide a multitude 
of benefits to the financial system and its participants, and “their 
importance has been acknowledged by the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, two chairs of the Federal Reserve 
Board, and Members of Congress.”36 Primarily, hedge funds improve 
liquidity and price efficiency in the markets, while reducing risk and 
facilitating global market integration.37 Hedge funds enhance liquidity 
and efficiency through active trading in a wide variety of market sectors.38 
A hedge fund’s presence is most influential in illiquid markets, i.e., 
                                                                                                                 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500-230.508; MANAGED FUNDS 
ASSOCIATION, supra note 26. 
 32. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7); MANAGED FUNDS ASSOCIATION, supra note 26. 
 33. Todd Zaun, Goldstein v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1 PEPP. J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 111, 130 (2007). 
 34. Funds of hedge funds are investment funds that invest in a group of hedge funds. 
 35. See Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., Institutional Investors, HEDGE FUND FACTS 
(2009), http://www.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/statistics/institutional-investors/ [http://pe 
rma.cc/ES6Y-XCNV]. 
 36. Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., supra note 21. 
 37. COAL. OF PRIVATE INV. COS., REFORMING HEDGE FUND REGULATIONS: THE 
WAY FORWARD 2 (2009), http://www.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/wp-content/uploads/20 
09/08/The_Way_Forward.pdf [https://perma.cc/56ZQ-RYUZ]. 
 38. See Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., supra note 21. 
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markets that are less actively traded in and where trading securities have 
high transaction costs and a wide bid-ask spread.39 In an illiquid market, 
hedge funds are willing to make long and short trades where others would 
steer clear.40 This increase in trading volume helps to provide liquidity 
and increase price accuracy for those nontraditional assets that would 
otherwise be impossible to value.41 A study by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Cleveland concluded that hedge fund shorting strategies, in particular, 
significantly reduce price volatility because the strategies usurp 
traditional buy-and-hold market sentiments.42 The study also concluded 
that such shorting strategies help to prevent asset bubbles, rather than 
contribute to them.43 
2. Hedge Fund Strategies Involving Short Selling 
This part of the Article aims to demonstrate the importance and 
prevalence of short selling in hedge fund trading, which reinforces this 
Article’s position that the current “long-only” disclosure regime is 
incomplete and ineffective, and therefore, in need of reform. Accordingly, 
this part begins by defining the terms “hedging,” “speculation,” and 
“leverage,” and follows with examples of some of the most common 
hedge fund investment strategies in order to shine light on the 
fundamental necessity of short selling for hedge funds. Then, select 
malevolent hedge fund strategies involving short selling will be discussed 
to show how the current disclosure regime can be exploited to the 
detriment of investors and the financial system as a whole. 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See Campbell R. Harvey, Illiquid Definition, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com 
/investing/glossary/i/illiquid [https://perma.cc/Z9EF-7RMU] (last visited Oct. 29, 2016). 
 40. See Ashworth II, supra note 23, at 661; Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., supra note 21. 
 41. See Ashworth II, supra note 23, at 661. 
 42. See Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., supra note 21; WILLIAM P. OSTERBERG & JAMES 
B. THOMSON, THE TRUTH ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS (1999), https://www.clevelandfed.org/e 
n/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/economic-commentary-ar 
chives/1999-economic-commentaries/ec-19990501-the-truth-about-hedge-funds.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/72JU-YEP3]. 
 43. See Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., supra note 21; see also OSTERBERG & THOMSON, 
supra note 42. 
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a. Hedging, Speculation, Leverage, and the Widespread Use of Short 
Selling 
Hedging, as it pertains to financial market investment, is the practice 
of trading a security while also placing a corresponding trade that helps 
to offset a potential loss.44 Hedging can be thought of as an insurance 
policy whereby you forfeit some upside gain in return for protection from 
downside losses.45 How much an investor wants to hedge will likely 
depend on its unique risk tolerance and investment objectives.46 A perfect 
hedge would be one where the hedge is 100% inversely correlated to the 
position, and thus all risk in a position is eliminated.47 A hedged trade 
would look like coupling a purchase of one share of Apple in the hopes 
that its market price increases with selling short one share of Microsoft as 
the hedge. This trade is hedged because Apple and Microsoft are in the 
same industry; if the entire industry loses value, you lose on the Apple 
purchase but gain on the Microsoft short sale. Conversely, if the entire 
industry experiences an uptick, you lose on the Microsoft short sale but 
gain on the Apple purchase. Depending on how much one wants to hedge, 
one could modify the investment by, say, purchasing two shares of Apple 
yet selling short only one share of Microsoft. 
Speculation, as it pertains to financial market investment, is the 
practice of trading a security with the expectation of substantial gain, but 
without protection from substantial loss.48 The key motivation for a 
speculative trade is that the value attributed to the potential gain is higher 
than the negative value attributed to the potential loss.49 Speculation 
differs from gambling because the former is akin to a calculated risk, 
while the latter is dependent on pure chance.50 A speculative trade would 
look like buying a share of Apple and hoping its market price increases 
or shorting a share of Apple and hoping its market price decreases, but 
without executing a corresponding hedge trade in either case. 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., Investment Strategies, supra note 1. 
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What separates hedging from speculation is leverage, which is the 
use of borrowed money or other financial instrument to increase the 
potential return on an investment.51 Leverage is used because it can 
magnify returns if the investment moves in the investor’s favor; however, 
it can also magnify losses if the investment moves against the investor.52 
For instance, let us assume that in case “X,” Apple’s stock price rises from 
$100 to $150, and in case “Y,” Apple’s stock price falls from $100 to $50. 
In case X without the use of leverage, the investor simply invests $100 
and receives $150, resulting in a 50% return. In case X with the use of 
leverage, let us assume that the investor invests $50 of its own money, 
and borrows the other $50. Here, the investor invests $50, receives $150, 
pays back the $50 borrowed, and is left with $100, resulting in a 100% 
return. Conversely, in case Y without the use of leverage, the investor 
invests $100 and receives $50, resulting in a negative 50% return. In case 
Y with the use of leverage, let us assume again that the investor invests 
$50 of its own money, and borrows the other $50. Here, the investor 
invests $50, receives $50, pays back the $50 borrowed, and is left with 
$0, resulting in a negative 100% return. Accordingly, the use of leverage 
can drastically increase return on investment in the bull case, but can also 
greatly decrease the return on investment in the bear case. 
Hedge funds use a combination of hedging, speculation, and 
leverage, although speculation is used much more sparingly.53 In fact, 
around 72% of hedge funds utilize leverage, yet given the magnified risks, 
only about 20% of hedge funds have leverage ratios above 2:1.54 It follows 
that it is vital for hedge funds to use short selling to protect their 
investments from downside losses, especially when leverage is employed. 
The most fundamental trading strategy employed by hedge funds is 
the equity long/short. The first modern-day hedge fund, formed by Alfred 
Winslow Jones in 1949, employed the equity long/short strategy to hedge 
against market risks by offsetting depreciations in long (short) position 
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values with appreciations in short (long) position values.55 The long 
position in Apple coupled with a short position in Microsoft as mentioned 
above is an example of an equity long/short strategy. The underlying 
principle of this strategy is to shift risk from the market to the adviser 
based on the assumption that the hedge fund adviser has the superior 
information and skill to select the best trades.56 While the equity 
long/short strategy is fundamental and used almost exclusively by around 
23% of hedge funds,57 it is also the foundational principle in many other 
trading strategies, and is thus used in some form by virtually every hedge 
fund. 
A derivative of the equity long/short strategy is employed by short 
bias hedge funds. Prior to the bull market of the 1990s, a significant 
number of hedge funds were dedicated short sellers, i.e., they almost 
exclusively sold short and had little upside protection.58 However, with 
the growth of the market in the 1990s, most of the funds moved from 
dedicated short bias to a net short bias, employing a larger long hedge to 
protect from market upswings.59 
Another prevalent trading strategy employed by hedge funds is 
arbitrage. In its simplest sense, arbitrage involves simultaneously buying 
and selling identical securities to profit from differences between the 
prices of those securities across multiple markets.60 The three most 
common forms of arbitrage include pairs trading, fixed-income arbitrage, 
and merger or risk arbitrage. 
Pairs trading is a form of relative value arbitrage—which is the 
exploitation of pricing inefficiencies across asset classes—and seeks to 
exploit the correlation between two similar securities.61 To use this 
strategy, hedge funds will identify two securities that are competitors or 
are in the same industry and have a strong correlation in stock price 
movements.62 When the correlation deviates from its norm, resulting in a 
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spread between the two securities that is wider than usual, the hedge fund 
will buy the underperforming stock and short the overperforming stock in 
the hopes that the value of each security converges back in line with the 
historical correlation.63 For example, assume shares of Apple and 
Microsoft historically move with 100% correlation, i.e., if Apple’s stock 
goes up by $1, Microsoft’s stock will also go up by $1. Assume further 
that Apple’s shares are trading at $100 and Microsoft’s shares at $50. 
Now, if a hedge fund sees Apple’s stock price go up by $1 while 
Microsoft’s stock goes up by $2, the hedge fund will employ a pairs trade, 
which is a bet that Microsoft is temporarily overvalued, and Apple is 
temporarily undervalued. To execute this strategy, the hedge fund will 
sell short a share of Microsoft at $52 and buy a share of Apple at $101. 
This trade becomes profitable if, for example, Microsoft shares drop by 
$2 and return to $50, and Apple shares drop by $1 and return to $100. 
Here, the hedge fund profits $2 from the Microsoft short sale and loses $1 
from the Apple purchase, netting a $1 profit. Similarly, this trade is also 
profitable if, for example, Microsoft shares increase by $1 to $53, and 
Apple shares increase by $2 to $103. Here, the investor loses $1 on the 
Microsoft short sale but profits $2 from the Apple purchase, again netting 
a $1 profit. Sometimes these correlative divergences are only a fraction 
of a penny per share, yet hedge funds utilize their large pool of capital to 
simultaneously place millions of identical trades to turn fractions of 
pennies into millions of dollars. 
Fixed income arbitrage is a strategy employed by a large portion of 
hedge funds. Fixed income arbitrage is similar to the equity long/short 
and pairs trading strategies, except it focuses on fixed income or debt 
instead of equity. This strategy aims to capitalize on pricing inefficiencies 
in fixed income securities through a combination of long and short 
positions.64 An example of a lucrative fixed income arbitrage trade 
involves exploiting liquidity discrepancies between newly issued thirty-
year United States Treasury bonds (called on-the-run bonds) and older 
thirty-year Treasury bonds (called off-the-run bonds).65 When new 
Treasury bonds are issued, the bonds that were previously on-the-run 
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bonds become off-the-run bonds and their price typically declines.66 At 
the same time, the bonds that were already off-the-run bonds experience 
a price uptick, and their prices align with the bonds that were just 
relegated from on-the-run to off-the-run status.67 Here, hedge funds will 
purchase the lower priced off-the-run bonds and sell short the higher 
priced on-the-run bonds to profit from the resulting price variance when 
new Treasury bonds are issued.68 The same fixed income arbitrage 
strategy can be used with bonds of varying risk profiles, where the fund 
bets on yield spreads in the hopes of generating profits when those spreads 
widen or narrow.69 
Merger arbitrage, also called risk arbitrage, is another strategy 
employed by hedge funds. Upon an announcement of an acquisition 
involving two publicly traded companies, the fund bets on the completion 
of the acquisition.70 In its simplest application, the merger arbitrage 
strategy profits if the deal is completed and loses if the deal falls apart. 
Historically, when a deal is announced, the buyer company’s (the 
“acquirer”) stock price experiences an immediate uptick, and the selling 
company’s (the “target”) stock price immediately increases to a point 
below the proposed merger price, which is the market price that reflects 
the per share value of the purchase price paid by the acquirer to the target 
shareholders.71 As the acquisition moves closer to its completion date, the 
acquirer’s stock price steadily decreases while the target’s stock price 
continues to steadily increase towards the proposed merger price.72 For 
instance, assume that before the announcement of an agreement by 
GiantCo to acquire TinyCo for $100 per share, GiantCo is trading at $30 
per share and TinyCo is trading at $75 per share. After the deal is 
announced, GiantCo’s share price jumps to $35 and TinyCo’s share prices 
jumps to $95, which is $5 less than the $100 that GiantCo plans to pay for 
each share. Here, a hedge fund sells short shares of GiantCo and 
simultaneously buys shares of TinyCo. As the deal moves closer to 
completion, GiantCo’s share price will steadily revert to its pre-
announcement price of $30, and TinyCo’s share price will steadily align 
with the $100 purchase price. If the deal is completed, the hedge fund 
making the merger arbitrage play will profit $5 per share from the short 
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sale of GiantCo’s stock and another $5 per share from the purchase of 
TinyCo’s stock. 
The equity long/short, pairs trading, fixed income arbitrage, and 
merger arbitrage strategies are just some examples of the ways in which 
hedge funds depend on short positions. Each strategy is founded upon 
market principles that have consistently delivered positive returns. Hedge 
funds are able to make investments that many other investors will not, or 
cannot, make largely because the funds have the asymmetrical advantage 
of superior capital, advisors, information, and technology that allows 
them to detect fractional mispricing in the market and execute protected 
investments in those areas. By investing in this manner, hedge funds 
enhance market liquidity, pricing efficiency, and risk allocation. 
b. The Exploitation of the Long-only Disclosure Regime 
Hedge funds, investors, companies, and the financial system are all 
harmed by the current long-only hedge fund disclosure regime. Without 
uniform reporting of short positions, hedge funds operate behind closed 
doors and can use short selling as a tool for fraudulent market 
manipulation. Hedge funds can act alone or in coordination with other 
hedge funds to exploit this regime by, for example, conducting a mirror 
of the “pump-and-dump” strategy called “short and distort,” predatory 
trading, or secondary offering manipulation. 
The “pump-and-dump” is a well-known and long-outlawed market 
manipulation tactic. To carry out this scheme, an investor buys a large 
percentage of a given security in order to artificially inflate the security’s 
price. When the price of the security rises, the investor sells its entire 
holding in the security simultaneously, causing the security’s price to 
expediently revert to, or fall below, its price before the pump-and-dump 
was executed. The perpetrators of this scheme profit from the artificial 
price inflation while the everyday investor is fooled into thinking it can 
share in the price upswing, only to find out that the uptick was artificial, 
resulting in a loss on the investment. 
A mirror of the “pump-and-dump” strategy can be executed on the 
short side and is called “short and distort.”73 The “short and distort” is 
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executed by shorting a mass quantity of one security to artificially depress 
the price and following it with a mass purchase of the security.74 A “short 
and distort” trader profits on the short sale as the price drops and also 
profits on the purchase of the security as the price stabilizes and rises back 
to its true market value. One of the most baleful variations of this strategy, 
which provides the derivation of its name, involves coupling the mass 
short sale with widespread public dissemination of false negative 
information about the company being shorted to further drive down the 
share price.75 Some studies by social scientists have shown that this 
variation of the “short and distort” scheme can be much more harmful 
than the traditional “pump-and-dump” scheme because investors tend to 
react more strongly to negative information than to positive information, 
causing the market to react faster and more dramatically to negative 
news.76 Some commentators have opined that this strategy, in some form, 
exacerbated stock market volatility during the financial crisis.77 Hedge 
funds, bereft of the obligation to report their short positions, are in a prime 
position to exploit this strategy to the detriment of the everyday investor. 
Predatory trading (or “front running”) is a strategy whereby a trader 
seeks to profit from driving down the market price of a security or forcing 
a vulnerable financial institution to liquidate assets at prices well below 
fair market value.78 For example, a hedge fund could continuously short 
an institution’s security thus driving its price lower and lower, all without 
the fear of being detected because the hedge fund currently does not have 
to publicly disclose those short positions. Hedge funds are in a 
particularly advantageous position to execute this strategy because the 
predatory trader must have a wealth of information about the vulnerable 
financial institution, including knowledge about its balance sheet and its 
current or impending insolvency.79 It follows that individual investors 
bear the brunt of the misfortune resulting from this strategy because they 
do not have the resources to glean this, presumably nonpublic, 
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information themselves; thus, they are left to sit idly by as the value of 
their portfolio dwindles. 
The current inadequate disclosure regime allows hedge funds to 
exploit secondary offerings as well, all while being immune from 
detection. To exploit secondary offerings, a hedge fund can short an 
issuer’s securities after the announcement of the secondary offering but 
before the pricing date.80 In effect, the issuer must then price and sell its 
new shares at artificially depressed prices, which lowers the issuer’s 
overall value while the hedge fund profits on the short sale.81 Despite 
regulatory attempts to limit shorting during a secondary offering, like 
Rule 105 of Regulation M, studies have shown that short sellers continue 
to create downward price pressure on secondary offerings.82 Once again, 
the individual investors are at a disadvantage, as they experience the 
decline in the value of their investments in these institutions. A disclosure 
regime requiring public reporting of short positions would go a long way 
to detect and deter this abusive activity. 
B. DISCLOSURE 
1. Purpose of Disclosure 
Federal securities laws were created to protect investors and the 
financial system as a whole “by providing for the transparency of markets 
[and by] prohibiting fraud.”83 Disclosure, which is mandated by these 
securities laws, is paramount to ensuring that these laws’ goals are 
accomplished. Disclosure regimes can be harmful to investors when they 
do not provide for the full and fair disclosure of information to all market 
participants, and thus, promote informational asymmetry. Inadequate 
disclosure regimes can harm the financial system by contributing to 
systemic risk. 
A market that is plagued with widespread informational asymmetry 
experiences a decreased investor base, higher transaction costs, lower 
liquidity, decreased efficiency, inaccurate pricing, and decreased profits 
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from trading.84 The theoretical premise of this observation lies in the fact 
that unlike in a transaction involving a sale of an item on Craigslist, 
individual investors in financial markets do not have the luxury of 
inspecting and analyzing the companies in which they want to invest.85 
Moreover, even if the individual investor had the resources to hire its own 
accountants, bankers, and financial analysts, the upfront costs of doing so 
would far exceed any potential gain on the purchase of a security.86 
Accordingly, individual investors must rely on disclosures by these 
companies.87 
The concern for investors arises when market participants like hedge 
funds deploy their superior resources to accumulate asymmetrical market 
advantages.88 These hedge funds can trade on information that is legally 
public, yet known only to them, until that information is fully 
incorporated into the price of the security, effectively excluding the 
possibility of an individual investor profiting from a market transaction.89 
Rational individual investors are then deterred from participating in the 
market.90 
An effective disclosure regime is one that helps to eliminate systemic 
risk. Systemic risk can be defined as: 
[T]he risk that an economic shock, such as market or institutional 
failure, triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either the failure of a 
chain of markets or institutions or a chain of significant losses to 
financial institutions, resulting in increases in the cost of capital or 
decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial 
financial-market price volatility.91 
Disclosure plays a big part in limiting systemic risk because it aims to 
provide equal information to all market participants and regulators. This 
allows market participants to transact with knowledge of the risk exposure 
posed by their counterparties and the market. Similarly, regulators can 
regulate more effectively because they have a more complete picture of 
the interconnectedness and interdependencies of the market. In sum, 
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when all parties act upon this full information set, actions that contribute 
to systemic risk are avoidable, and those systemic risks that do exist can 
be discovered earlier. 
2. What is Disclosed Today 
For the purposes of this Article, the types of mandatory disclosure 
applicable to hedge funds can be divided into two groups: (1) long-only 
disclosure, which, as its name suggests, only requires hedge funds to 
publicly disclose their long positions; and (2) long-and-short disclosure, 
which requires hedge funds to publicly disclose both their long positions 
and their short positions. 
a. Long-only Disclosure (Form 13F) 
Currently, in the United States, hedge funds are required to publicly 
report only certain long positions in equity securities. In accordance with 
Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 
the disclosure is to be made on Form 13F (“13F”) and filed with the 
SEC.92 Section 13(f) applies to “[e]very institutional investment manager 
which uses the mails, or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce in the course of its business as an institutional investment 
manager and which exercises investment discretion with respect to 
accounts holding equity securities . . . having an aggregate fair market 
value . . . of at least $100,000,000” or an amount, not less than 
$10,000,000, that the SEC in its discretion deems necessary for reporting 
purposes.93 
The 13F filing shall include, with certain exemptions and extensions, 
“the name of the issuer and the title, class, CUSIP number, number of 
shares or principal amount, and aggregate fair market value . . . of each 
such [equity] security” that the investment manager holds as a long 
position.94 13F filings are to be made within forty-five days of the end of 
the most recent quarter.95 The SEC collects these disclosures and makes 
available a list of these equity securities and presents it in a manner that 
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will “maximize the usefulness of the information to other Federal and 
State authorities and the public.”96 
The purpose of 13F disclosure is to “create in the Commission a 
central repository of historical and current data about the investment 
activities of institutional investment managers.”97 This therefore aims to 
achieve the aforementioned goals of federal securities laws98 by 
establishing a uniform reporting standard and centralized database that 
serve to increase the amount of public market data, and thus, facilitate a 
general understanding of how hedge funds affect financial markets.99 
Specifically, 13F filings require hedge funds to disclose long 
positions in United States equity markets, American Depositary Receipts, 
purchased put and call options, and convertible notes.100 Interestingly, 
despite short selling making up a significant amount of hedge funds’ 
trading activity,101 13F filings do not require disclosure of short positions, 
borrowed securities, short derivative positions, cash positions, or 
positions in any asset class other than equity securities.102 
The cost and time required to complete a 13F filing are reasonably 
low compared to the $100,000,000 threshold amount in long equity 
positions that triggers mandatory 13F filings. The SEC estimates that 13F 
filings cost about $3000 per report, or $12,000 per year.103 The SEC 
further estimates that each hedge fund filer will spend an average of 24.7 
hours preparing the report.104 In addition, the SEC approximates that filers 
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who must amend their filings or supplement their expired or denied 
confidential treatment requests will spend four additional hours on the 
resubmission.105 
To prevent or suspend the requisite public disclosure of certain long 
equity positions, hedge funds can apply to the SEC for confidential 
treatment.106 In enacting this exemption, Congress recognized that some 
disclosures might not be in the public interest because they could have 
harmful effects for either hedge fund advisers or those investors whose 
assets are under the advisers’ management.107 Advisers could be harmed 
because certain information may reveal their proprietary investment 
strategies.108 Without the ability to protect their proprietary practices, 
hedge funds would be disincentivized to expend their resources because 
outsiders could unfairly reap the benefits that the hedge funds derived. 
Furthermore, such a public revelation would minimize the hedge funds’ 
profit margins because outsiders could mimic their strategies. 
Additionally, investors could be harmed when, say, public disclosure 
reveals which securities are held by an individual, estate, or trust.109 
Recently, the SEC added merger arbitrage to the list of categories eligible 
for confidential treatment.110 
The procedures for requesting confidential treatment are set out 
under Rule 24b-2 of the Exchange Act111 and principally require three 
things. First, the hedge fund must provide certain information, such as the 
grounds for objecting to public disclosure, the basis for the objection to 
be eligible under the SEC’s framework adopted under the Freedom of 
Information Act,112 as well as a description of the hedge fund’s investment 
strategy and accompanying analysis supporting the request.113 Second, the 
hedge fund must “justify the time period for which confidential treatment 
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is sought,”114 which is limited to a period of three, six, nine, or twelve 
months from the date the confidential treatment request is filed.115 Third, 
the hedge fund must demonstrate how its proprietary strategy would be 
divulged if the particular securities were disclosed, how the particular 
securities relate to its overall investment strategy, and how the public 
would be able to detect the strategy as a result of the disclosure.116 
In 2014, the SEC received a total of 172 confidential treatment 
requests and granted 143 of them.117 From 2011 to 2014, approximately 
85% of all confidential treatment requests were granted.118 Among the 
filers, hedge funds are responsible for approximately 56% of all 
confidential requests.119 On average, about 33.8% of a hedge fund’s total 
portfolio value is kept confidential, which represents around $1 trillion in 
total value.120 The hedge funds that most often seek confidential treatment 
include those with large portfolio sizes, high portfolio turnover, and those 
who manage portfolios with high concentration in a given industry or 
sector.121 The types of stocks that make up the bulk of the requests 
generally include those associated with information-sensitive events like 
merger arbitrage, as well as stocks with high volatility, small market caps, 
and high historical returns.122 When compared to non-confidential 
holdings, hedge funds tend to conduct more trading in the confidential 
holdings during the confidential period, and it typically takes much longer 
to accumulate the full portfolio in the confidential holdings.123 As for 
performance, the confidential holdings realize significantly higher returns 
compared to non-confidential holdings.124 In fact, over a twelve-month 
investment horizon, confidential holdings outperform non-confidential 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See id. at *3. 
 115. See Carpenter, supra note 84, at 775. 
 116. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 106, at *4. 
 117. See Richard Teitelbaum, SEC Grants Too Many Confidential Treatment 
Requests, Critics Say, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Oct. 07, 2015), http://www.institutional 
investor.com/article/3495423/asset-management-regulation/sec-grants-too-many-
confidential-treatment-requests-critics-say.html#/.VzILghUrKRs [http://perma.cc/UR3Z 
-PZFU]. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See VIKAS AGARWAL ET AL., Uncovering Hedge Fund Skill from the Portfolio 
Holdings They Hide, 68 J. FIN. 739, 740 (2013). 
 120. See id. at 740, 749. 
 121. See id. at 741, 756-58. 
 122. See id. at 741-42. 
 123. See id. at 741. 
 124. See id. at 741, 768. 
350 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
holdings by 5.2% to 7.5% on an annualized basis.125 An analysis of short 
interest, which indicates the percentage of total outstanding shares of a 
particular stock that are sold short,126 exhibits significant differentiation 
between disclosed short sales and short sales kept confidential.127 The 
stocks in which short positions were disclosed experienced abnormally 
high short interest at the time of disclosure, and that level of abnormality 
continued for about two weeks before returning to normal levels.128 
Interestingly, the stocks in which short positions were kept confidential 
evinced no such abnormal increases.129 
b. Long-and-Short Disclosure 
As pertains to this Article, there are currently two disclosure regimes 
that require disclosure of both long and short positions. In the United 
States, certain hedge funds are required to file Form PF, which discloses 
long and short positions to the SEC.130 In the EU, certain hedge funds are 
required by the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
(“AIFMD”) to publicly disclose long and short positions.131 
i. Form PF: Privately Disclosed Long-and-Short Positions 
Form PF, required by Rule 204(b)-1 of the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940,132 mandates disclosure by hedge fund advisers, among others. 
An adviser must file Form PF if it “(1) is registered or required to register 
                                                                                                                 
 125. See id. (showing this difference as calculated by the value-weighted Four-Factor 
Alpha and DGTW-Adjusted Returns tests, two industry standard measures of 
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 126. Short Interest Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/ 
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 130. See infra Section I.C.2.b.i. 
 131. See Directive 2011/61, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
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with the SEC; (2) advises one or more private funds; and (3) had at least 
$150 million in regulatory assets under management attributable to 
private funds as of the end of its most recently completed fiscal year.”133 
An adviser designated as managing a “hedge fund” for the purposes of 
Form PF is subject to heightened disclosure obligations.134 Form PF 
defines “hedge fund” to include a private fund that meets one of the 
following hedge fund characteristics: “(a) a performance fee that takes 
into account market value (instead of only realized gains); (b) high 
leverage; or (c) short selling.”135 The form then categorizes three types of 
“Large Private Fund Advisers” based on different corresponding 
thresholds for assets under management: 
 Any adviser having at least $1.5 billion in regulatory assets under 
management attributable to hedge funds as of the end of any month 
in the prior fiscal quarter; 
 Any adviser managing a liquidity fund and having at least $1 billion 
in combined regulatory assets under management attributable to 
liquidity funds and registered money market funds as of the end of 
any month in the prior fiscal quarter; and   
 Any adviser having at least $2 billion in regulatory assets under 
management attributable to private equity funds as of the last day of 
the adviser’s most recently completed fiscal year.136   
Most advisers of smaller hedge funds are only required to file Form PF 
annually.137 Large hedge fund advisers must update information related to 
their hedge funds on a quarterly basis.138 
                                                                                                                 
 133. 15 U.S.C. §80b-3 (2012); Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds 
and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 
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Release No. 3308, 102 SEC Docket 1266 (2011). 
 138. See id. 
352 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Form PF has four sections, the first two of which are required to be 
completed by the hedge fund adviser.139 Section 1 requires disclosure of 
information regarding: (1) the adviser’s identity and assets under 
management;140 (2) the size, leverage, and performance of the adviser’s 
fund;141 and (3) general information about the hedge fund, including 
investment strategies, percent of assets employed in high frequency 
trading, as well as any significant counterparty exposures.142 Section 2 
requires disclosure of hedge fund-specific information, including: (1) the 
value and holding duration of assets (both long and short) in commodities 
and fixed income, the value of turnover in certain asset classes, and a 
geographical breakdown of investments held by the hedge fund;143 and 
(2) portfolio liquidity, risk metrics, impact of certain market factors, 
holdings of unencumbered cash, concentration of positions, base 
currency, collateral practices with counterparties, trades cleared through 
a central clearing company, obligations to creditors, investment horizon 
breakdowns, and much more.144 
As is unequivocally evident from its substantive reporting 
requirements, Form PF is aimed at understanding the systemic risk 
implications of hedge fund activity.145 For example, much of Section 1 
serves to accomplish the following: 
[A]llow FSOC to monitor certain systemic trends for the broader 
private fund industry,146 . . . monitor systemic risk that could be 
transmitted through counterparty exposure, track how different 
strategies are affected by and correlated with different market stresses, 
and follow the extent of private fund activities conducted away from 
regulated exchanges and clearing systems.147 
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 140. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF §1(a). 
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Likewise, much of Section 2 is “designed to assist FSOC in monitoring 
asset classes in which hedge funds may be significant investors and trends 
in hedge funds’ exposures,”148 “identify[ing] concentrations in particular 
asset classes,”149 “monitoring the composition of hedge fund exposures 
over time as well as the liquidity of those exposures,”150 examining hedge 
fund’s leverage,151 and “monitor[ing] the hedge fund’s susceptibility to 
failure through investor redemptions in the event the fund experiences 
stress due to market or other factors.”152 
In contrast to Form 13F, the data disclosed in Form PF is not publicly 
released.153 The SEC may share this information with the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, the FSOC, and other Federal departments, 
agencies, or self-regulatory organizations when it is within their 
jurisdictional scope.154 The SEC justified the importance of keeping this 
information confidential based on the fact that Form PF extracts non-
public information, and the disclosure of such information could 
adversely affect the fund and its investors.155 In fact, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act156 was amended to shield 
Form PF disclosures from demands made under the Freedom of 
Information Act.157 The SEC can, however, use the information disclosed 
on Form PF in an enforcement action.158 
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The SEC estimated that Form PF, when compared to Form 13F, 
would impose a significantly heavier burden on advisers to compile, 
review, and electronically file. For smaller hedge fund advisers, the SEC 
estimated that a total of 40 burden hours and 15 burden hours would be 
necessary to complete initial and subsequent Form PF filings, 
respectively. Likewise for larger hedge fund advisers, the initial and 
subsequent Form PF filings would require 300 burden hours and 140 
burden hours, respectively.159 
ii. European Union: Publicly Disclosed Long-and-Short 
In response to the financial crisis, the EU created the AIFMD.160 
Effected on July 21, 2011, the AIFMD created “rules for the 
authorisation, ongoing operation and transparency of managers of 
alternative investment funds [(“AIFs”)].”161 For the purposes of the 
AIFMD, AIFs include those “entities managing AIFs as a regular 
business . . . which raise capital from a number of investors with a view 
to investing that capital for the benefit of those investors in accordance 
with a defined investment policy.”162 A non-EU alternative investment 
fund manager (“AIFM”) is subject to the requirements of the AIFMD if 
it is “(a) managing or marketing one or more AIFs established in the 
European Union to investors in the European Union; or (b) marketing one 
or more AIFs established outside the European Union (a non-EU AIF) to 
investors in the European Union.”163 
As part of the AIFMD, on March 14, 2012, the EU adopted 
Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (“EU 236”), mandating hedge fund 
disclosure of short positions, long positions, and credit default swaps.164 
The EU 236 mandate is wide in scope and covers 
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 160. See AIFMD, supra note 131. 
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not only short positions created by trading shares or sovereign debt on 
trading venues but also short positions created by trading outside 
trading venues and net short positions created by the use of 
derivatives, such as options, futures, index-related instruments, 
contracts for differences and spread bets relating to shares or 
sovereign debt.165  
Short positions include traditional short sales and any “transaction which 
creates or relates to a financial instrument . . . where the effect or one of 
the effects . . . is to confer a financial advantage on the [person or entity] 
entering into that transaction in the event of a decrease in the price or 
value of the share or debt instrument.”166 Identically, long positions 
include traditional buy-and-hold transactions, as well as transactions that 
have the effect of conferring a financial advantage “in the event of an 
increase in the price or value of the share or debt instrument.”167 In 
addition, any form of economic interest in credit default swaps relating to 
sovereign debt issuers should also be disclosed.168 EU 236 includes credit 
default swaps because a purchase of credit default swaps without holding 
a corresponding long position in the underlying assets is essentially a 
short position on the underlying debt instrument.169 
EU 236 mandates two different forms of disclosure that are relevant 
to this Article’s discussion. First, hedge funds must disclose a change in 
net short position when it reaches a certain threshold.170 Second, the 
relevant government entity of each EU Member State must submit a 
summary of net short positions to the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (“ESMA”) on a quarterly basis.171 
The EU 236 establishes an event-driven framework wherein 
disclosure is necessary when a “change in a net short position results in 
an increase or decrease above or below certain thresholds.”172 
Furthermore, a two-tier model was created so that lower threshold 
changes in net short positions are disclosed privately to regulators, and 
higher threshold changes in net short positions are disclosed publicly to 
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the market.173 Mandatory disclosure to a government entity is triggered 
when such a change is a percentage that equals 0.2% of the outstanding 
shares of a company’s stock, and at each 0.1% above that.174 Mandatory 
public disclosure is triggered when such a change is a percentage that 
equals 0.5% of the outstanding shares of a company’s stock, and at each 
0.1% above that.175 
The event-driven disclosure must include the identity of the AIFM, 
the size of the relevant position, the company whose stock is the subject 
of the position, and the date the position was “created, changed or ceased 
to be held.”176 The disclosure must be made no later than the end of the 
day following the change that triggered the disclosure obligation.177 
On a quarterly basis, the relevant government entity of each EU 
Member State must provide a summary to ESMA that includes 
information about net short positions in public equity and sovereign debt, 
and, in certain circumstances, uncovered positions relating to sovereign 
credit default swaps.178 Moreover, ESMA can at any time request 
additional information on net short positions in those securities, and the 
relevant government agency has seven days to comply.179 
EU 236 was prompted by the divergent regulatory frameworks of EU 
Member States prior to and during the financial crisis.180 The European 
Parliament felt a uniform regulatory framework and reporting standard 
would facilitate “the proper functioning of the internal market, . . . ensure 
a high level of consumer and investor protection,” and eliminate sources 
of systemic risk.181 This regime aims to increase transparency surrounding 
significant short positions so as to allow market participants to make 
better decisions, and to provide regulators with the opportunity to address 
“identified risks without unduly detracting from the benefits that short 
selling provides to the quality and efficiency of markets.”182 In developing 
the two-tier disclosure model, the European Parliament reasoned that 
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private disclosure to regulators will “enable them to monitor and, where 
necessary, investigate short selling that could create systemic risks, be 
abusive or create disorderly markets.”183 The European Parliament 
recognized that public disclosure of some information “could have a 
detrimental effect on . . . markets where liquidity is already impaired,”184 
while acknowledging that such disclosure will nonetheless “provide 
useful information to other market participants about significant 
individual short positions in shares.”185 
In addition to disclosure mandates, EU 236 also grants EU Member 
State regulators and ESMA the authority to restrict certain market 
practices. Generally, both uncovered short sales and uncovered sovereign 
credit default swaps are restricted.186 During times of market turmoil, EU 
Member State regulators are granted the authority to prohibit or impose 
conditions relating to short positions so long as the chosen measure does 
not have a disproportionately “detrimental effect on the efficiency of 
financial markets.”187 ESMA itself may intervene to prohibit or impose 
conditions relating to short positions when there are cross-border 
implications or there is a threat to the stability or integrity of the financial 
system as a whole, and when EU Member State regulators either do not 
take measures to address the threat or when the measures taken are 
inadequate.188 
3. Effect of Disclosure on the Market 
A key consideration in deciding what to include in a disclosure 
regime is the impact that the introduction of such public disclosure of 
short positions may have on the market. Luckily, the EU, having already 
implemented such a regime, furnishes the opportunity to measure that 
impact. This section will first parse out the effect of short disclosure on 
changes in share price. Next, this section will look to the changes in short 
interest, bid-ask spread, and follow-on shorting activity to determine the 
effect that short position disclosure has on liquidity, and identify the 
catalyst of shorting activity. 
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Interestingly, immediately after a short position is disclosed there is 
no significant price reaction. More precisely, in the three days following 
a short position disclosure, the corresponding stock price experiences an 
abnormal return of just -0.41%.189 This return remains at low levels until 
about the tenth day following the disclosure, when the stock exhibits an 
abnormal return of -1.24%.190 On the ninetieth day following the 
disclosure, the abnormal returns grow to a significant -5.23%.191 In sum, 
a disclosure of a short position has no significant price effect immediately 
after disclosure, but there is a gradual depression of the share price over 
time.192 Short interest, on the other hand, exhibits a significant negative 
reaction after disclosure of a short position.193 Generally, a reduction in 
short interest is a predictor of high future returns, and vice versa.194 The 
bid-ask spread, which represents the difference between the prices that a 
buyer is willing to pay and a seller is willing to accept for a given 
security,195 also experiences a significant reduction in the disclosed 
stocks.196 A reduction in the bid-ask spread suggests that the market is less 
fearful of the informational asymmetry between buyers and sellers, 
leading to increased market liquidity.197 
An analysis of follow-on shorting activity, which is the increase in 
short position disclosures after the first short position disclosure, shows 
that there is a positive correlation between the size of the disclosed short 
position and the likelihood that a different short seller will disclose a short 
position in the same stock within a month.198 In addition, the likelihood 
of follow-on disclosures increases in proportion to the amount of assets 
under management of the initial disclosing entity.199 However, the amount 
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of short activity does not change significantly after disclosure. Instead, 
most of the changes in short activity occur before the disclosure.200 
In sum, short position disclosure results in an increase in expected 
future returns, as well as an increase in market liquidity.201 The 
combination of a greater probability of follow-on shorting activity for 
larger disclosers and the fact that most short activity occurs before the 
disclosure seems to suggest that information is the catalyst behind short 
activity, not the disclosure itself.202  
II. INADEQUACIES OF TODAY’S PUBLIC DISCLOSURE REGIMES 
This part begins by establishing the objectives that Form 13F seeks 
to achieve through mandated disclosure of long positions, and then 
surveys evidence of market manipulation and hedge fund-imposed 
systemic risk in an effort to prove that 13F is failing to accomplish these 
objectives. The remainder of this part then demonstrates how long-only 
disclosure and the limited resources of the SEC result in a release of 
information to the public that is wholly inadequate. 
A. 13F DISCLOSURE FAILS TO SERVE PURPOSE 
As discussed in Part I,203 federal securities laws that mandate public 
disclosure are designed to serve a specific purpose. The SEC opined that 
the purpose of public reporting requirements is to “provide a level of 
transparency that will help to identify practices that may harm investors, 
will aid investors in conducting their own due diligence, and will deter 
advisers’ fraud and facilitate earlier discovery of potential misconduct.”204 
Form 13F, a public reporting requirement created by the Exchange 
Act, also has a specific purpose. As discussed in Part I of this Article and 
stated on the form itself, “[t]he purpose of Form 13F is to provide a 
reporting and disclosure system to collect specific information and to 
disseminate such information to the public about the holdings of 
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institutional investment managers.”205 In the 1978 adopting release of 
13F, the SEC specified two main objectives. First, the public reporting 
requirement should provide more factual information to the market to 
facilitate the market’s understanding of the “influence and impact” of 
hedge funds.206 Second, the requirement should result in a “uniform 
centralized data base” that is managed, processed, and disseminated by 
the SEC.207 In addition, as noted in a no-action letter written by the SEC 
regarding 13F obligations, SEC representatives have testified that “the 
primary users and beneficiaries of information collected by Form 13F 
should be the public.”208 
The change in reporting periods from annually to quarterly is also 
instructive of 13F’s purpose. As originally adopted on June 15, 1978, 13F 
only required annual disclosure.209 After a notice and comment period, the 
SEC amended 13F to require quarterly disclosure.210 In the final rule, the 
SEC stated that quarterly reporting would “enhance the likelihood of an 
effectively functioning system.”211 The SEC did, however, acknowledge 
that the fourfold increase in the reporting obligation would impose more 
costs upon filers.212 Ultimately, it found that any resulting burdens of 
quarterly reporting would be outweighed by the significant benefits that 
the information would provide to investors.213 The SEC was therefore 
willing to impose additional burdens upon filers for the sake of providing 
investors with more information, which would inevitably result in an 
improvement in market liquidity, price discovery, and overall capital 
allocation. 
Despite the clear and noble purposes of 13F, the form falls terribly 
short of achieving them. There is clear evidence of hedge funds taking 
advantage of the lax reporting requirements of 13F to unfairly benefit 
themselves at the expense of investors. Furthermore, the systemic risks 
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that hedge funds contribute to the market are only exacerbated by the 
current 13F regime, which perpetuates a lack of transparency on the 
market, and thereby fails to facilitate the market’s understanding of the 
influence and impact of hedge funds. 
1. Widespread Market Manipulation Under the Current 13F Regime 
Under the current 13F long-only public disclosure regime, there is 
evidence of widespread market manipulation that specifically takes 
advantage of 13F’s lax mandates. The “short and distort” strategy, 
predatory trading strategy, and manipulative short selling strategy relating 
to secondary equity offerings all capitalize on the ability to be executed 
without detection. Even voluntary disclosure of short positions under this 
regime provides a manipulative avenue for generating profit. 
Interestingly, confidential treatment requests can also be used as a 
manipulative tool to disingenuously extend the time before a hedge fund 
adviser has to disclose a given equity position. 
Clear examples exist as to the exploitation of the “short and distort 
strategy.” The technological innovations of the twenty-first century have 
only rendered this strategy more effective, as the media can now provide 
up-to-the-second market coverage to the public.214 For example, in 2002, 
false rumors swirled throughout the market that J.P. Morgan Chase was 
facing fines, criminal prosecution, and a large loss from commodities and 
derivatives trading, and was ultimately approaching inevitable 
insolvency.215 In a span of less than ten days, these rumors drove down 
J.P. Morgan Chase’s stock price by an astounding 39%,216 or $24 billion 
in terms of market capitalization,217 which was its lowest price going back 
six years.218 J.P. Morgan then explicitly denied the false rumors, and in 
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just three trading days its share price clawed back 59% of the losses, or 
$14 billion in terms of market capitalization.219 
The “short and distort” scheme was also prevalent leading up to and 
during the financial crisis. In 2008, Bear Stearns, a global investment 
bank and securities trading and brokerage firm, saw its share price drop 
roughly 60% in a matter of days as a result of a sudden surge in short sales 
of its stock.220 Doubtfully a coincidence, the seemingly impromptu short 
selling occurred just as rumors were spreading that Bear Stearns was fast 
approaching a liquidity crisis.221 Bear Stearns’ CEO, Alan D. Schwartz, 
later opined that the insidious rumors were spread intentionally and 
ultimately led to the short sales.222 Also in 2008, Lehman Brothers, a 
global financial services firm, fell victim to the dissemination of a similar 
false rumor that ultimately led to its share price falling nearly 40% in just 
one day.223 A Lehman spokesperson implied that a “short and distort” 
scheme had been carried out to the firm’s detriment when she stated, 
“[Lehman is] suspicious that the rumors are being promulgated by short 
sellers of our stock that have an economic self-interest.”224 
This strategy is so common that legislators and regulators in various 
financial markets have recognized it as a major problem. United States 
Senator Christopher J. Dodd has said that this strategy is more than just a 
spreading of rumors; rather, the strategy amounts to collusion.225 Across 
the pond, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority stated that it 
would “cast a wide net” to identify and punish those who attempt to gain 
from spreading lies.226 The current short-only public disclosure regime in 
the United States facilitates this type of behavior, as perpetrators can carry 
out this strategy without the public ever knowing. 
Investors have utilized the lax long-only disclosure regime to carry 
out predatory trading strategies. The best example is the 1998 collapse of 
Long Term Capital Management (“LTCM”), a relative value hedge fund 
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that fell victim to a front running predatory trading strategy.227 Due to 
some investments that went awry, LTCM sustained losses representing 
about 45% of its equity value, which prompted it to liquidate assets to 
delever its portfolio.228 As word of LTCM’s distressed condition spread 
throughout the economy, predatory traders rushed to the market to front-
run LTCM by short selling its assets before LTCM had the chance to 
liquidate them.229 The short sales caused the market price of these assets 
to plummet, making it near impossible for LTCM to recover its losses 
because the fund had no choice but to sell its assets at the now depressed 
market prices.230 Although the identities of LTCM’s counterparties 
remain anonymous, an empirical study conducted in 2003 by Fang Cai, 
then a staff economist of the Division of International Finance of the 
Federal Reserve Board, concluded that the counterparties engaged in 
significant front running by executing the short sale trades merely one or 
two minutes before LTCM executed its own trades.231 Cai’s findings 
make sense. LTCM’s counterparties were incentivized to short sell the 
assets because they had an economic self-interest in LTCM’s collapse. 
The long-only disclosure regime allowed these counterparties to carry out 
this predatory trading strategy with both criminal and reputational 
immunity. 
Evidence suggests that manipulative short selling pertaining to 
secondary equity offerings (“SEO”) still exists on the market and 
contributes to a material downward price pressure on United States’ 
SEOs.232 For example, in 2012, J.P. Morgan sold short shares of American 
International Group (“AIG”) four days before AIG sold shares in a 
secondary offering.233 Four days later, J.P. Morgan purchased shares from 
the AIG secondary offering, resulting in a profit of $27,003.234 Because 
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of Rule 105 of Regulation M—which prohibits short selling a stock within 
five days of participating in a secondary offering for that same stock—
J.P. Morgan was fined more than $1 million by the SEC and was forced 
to disgorge over $650,000 in profits from the prohibited activities.235 
While Rule 105 has gone a long way to catch some short selling 
manipulators, the evidence suggests that undetected uses of this practice 
are still prevalent.236 The long-only public disclosure regime allows these 
manipulators to engage in this practice without having to publicly reveal 
the trades. 
In a market with a disclosure regime that only requires reporting of 
long positions, the voluntary disclosure of short positions can have a 
magnified effect on market prices; and therefore, can be used as a 
manipulation device. For example, Kerrisdale Capital, a hedge fund, 
voluntarily disclosed that it had taken a short position in Zafgen Inc., a 
biotech company.237 After the disclosure, Zafgen’s share price decreased 
by 10.6%.238 Kerrisdale was motivated to disclose its short position as 
there was a possibility that a Zafgen drug, called Beloranib, was not going 
to get approved by the Food and Drug Administration because of two 
deaths that may have resulted from its use.239 Sahm Adrangi, founder and 
chief investment officer of Kerrisdale, claimed that they disclosed their 
short position to stimulate a discussion as to the true worth of Zafgen’s 
shares.240 In this regard, Adrangi considers Kerrisdale to be a “short 
activist,” meaning the fund takes and discloses short positions to raise 
awareness and promote change.241 Adrangi did not say, however, that 
there is a self-fulfilling profit motive in this strategy: by taking a short 
position and then disclosing that position publicly, the fund hopes to 
lower the share price, and thus make a profit. With or without an altruistic 
motive, using voluntary public disclosure to drive the price of a security 
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in a direction that is favorable to the discloser is a certainly a form of 
manipulation. 
A hedge fund manager can use confidential treatment requests as a 
tool to improperly extend the time before an equity position needs to be 
disclosed. An audit revealed that for some confidential treatment requests, 
the time between when the request is filed with the SEC and when the 
SEC delivers a written response to the request exceeded twelve months.242 
In the period after being filed with the SEC and before the SEC’s 
response, the equity position does not have to be publicly disclosed.243 
This is significant given that if a confidential treatment request is 
approved, the maximum amount of time that the position can remain 
confidential is twelve months, after which the position must be disclosed 
or a new confidential request filed.244 Accordingly, a hedge fund manager 
could file a confidential treatment request that it knows will be denied by 
the SEC just so it can keep the position confidential in the time period 
before the SEC renders a decision. Effectively, any equity position could 
be granted de facto confidential treatment, at least for some amount of 
time, before the SEC delivers a written decision. 
2. The Current 13F Regime Fails to Mitigate Systemic Risk 
Deterring market manipulation is not the only goal of 13F; systemic 
risk mitigation is a key component to optimizing capital allocation, price 
discovery, and liquidity. If the current 13F long-only disclosure regime is 
to satisfy its purpose as it relates to systemic risk, there should be a level 
of transparency in the market that supports the mitigation of systemic risk 
by allowing market participants and regulators to rationally act and react 
to market trends and conditions. Undoubtedly, hedge funds contribute to 
systemic risk, in part, due to their size and operational opacity. The ability 
of hedge funds to instigate dramatic and unexpected market and asset 
price swings affects a lot more market participants than one may think. 
Indeed, government entities are aware of hedge funds’ contributions to 
systemic risk, as evidenced by the Federal Reserve’s bailout of LTCM in 
1998. An analysis of the impact of hedge funds both before and during 
the financial crisis is indicative of their role in systemic risk creation. 
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Given that there are over 10,000 hedge funds currently operating and 
managing over $3 trillion in assets, hedge funds play a tremendous role 
in the financial system and contribute to systemic risk.245 Despite short 
selling representing such a large and integral part of hedge funds’ hedging 
practices, the public is largely blind to the nature of hedge funds’ 
investments.246 As mentioned above, hedge funds operate under what is 
essentially an invisible cloak as they are able to execute short selling 
strategies to manipulate the market. The combination of this apparent 
operational anonymity, the proprietary nature of their strategies, and the 
astonishing amount of assets under their management results in a 
frightening uncertainty as to how deeply intertwined hedge funds are with 
the markets they operate in, as well as with markets and industries in 
which they have no direct involvement. 
The tendency of hedge funds to sell assets suddenly and below 
market value is a source of systemic risk. Intuitively, investors of hedge 
funds can pull their money out of the fund; however, this may be difficult 
in practice as the investors’ capital may be employed by the hedge fund 
on a type of investment that prohibits withdrawal. Yet, the hedge fund is 
obligated to return the funds to the investor, so it must liquidate assets to 
obtain the cash for distribution. Now assume that a large portion of the 
fund’s investors want to withdraw at the same time. In this case, the hedge 
fund must sell off a large quantity of assets to obtain the necessary cash 
to distribute to the withdrawing investors. The laws of supply and demand 
dictate that an asset sale of this magnitude and in such a short time period 
will drive down the price of those assets. Assume further that the investors 
sought withdrawal because of some market event, and that market event 
caused investors of other hedge funds to seek withdrawal of their funds 
as well. In this case, there are many hedge funds, all selling assets at the 
same time, thus driving the prices lower and lower. This may seem great 
for the buyers of those assets as they are paying pennies on the dollar, but 
is troubling for the hedge funds’ creditors who expect to recoup their 
investments. This becomes decreasingly possible in this scenario: the 
hedge fund borrowed and traded on the value of assets at their assigned 
market values, and now the fund has received less than that value, but its 
obligations to its counterparties and creditors remains unchanged. If this 
causes hedge funds to fold, those counterparties and creditors must absorb 
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huge losses, which can ripple throughout the financial system.247 Also, 
other institutions will be indirectly impacted due to holding similar assets 
that the hedge fund sold at low prices, thus necessitating unexpected 
adjustments in asset price.248 Another problem could arise when, as 
happens daily, hedge funds enter into credit default swaps with 
investment banks and borrow money from those banks to enter into the 
swaps.249 Here, the bank has considerable exposure to the hedge fund, and 
a default could have severe negative consequences.250 Whatever the 
source, there exists a pervasive incertitude regarding the boundlessness of 
hedge funds’ impact on systemic risk. 
Evidently, the Fed was well attuned to this uncertainty and its 
potential implications for systemic risk, as manifested by the Fed’s 
orchestration of a $3.65 billion bailout of LTCM in 1998. The Fed 
organized the LTCM bailout due to fears that the risk accumulated by 
LTCM’s highly leveraged portfolio could quite possibly have triggered a 
systemic chain reaction that could have decimated the financial system.251 
LTCM, similar to hedge funds today, was so deeply interconnected with 
the financial system that its collapse could have had widespread 
consequences.252 LTCM initially focused on bond arbitrage, a form of 
fixed income arbitrage, but as time went on it expanded its strategies to 
include pairs trading, merger arbitrage, currency, interest, and default 
swaps, volatility trading, and global markets.253 As a result, LTCM’s 
assets under management ballooned to over $128 billion, and the 
magnifying effects of its aggressive leverage strategy implicated over $1 
trillion of market exposure worldwide.254 The secrecy in which LTCM 
operated exacerbated fears surrounding its potentially rippling impact on 
the market. Partners in the fund would never reveal specifics about their 
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strategies, and even went so far as to disseminate a single trade across 
multiple banks to avoid unveiling their secrets.255 As trades went south, 
LTCM started to take enormous losses, as much as $500 million in one 
day and $2 billion in one month.256 LTCM could no longer maintain its 
secrecy as such drastic price swings caught the attention of not just 
LTCM’s counterparties, but also other market participants.257 LTCM’s 
fate was sealed after Bear Stearns stopped clearing LTCM’s trades, and 
LTCM’s attempts to raise capital from other banks and individuals such 
as Warren Buffet and George Soros failed.258 The Fed, based on this 
information and the fear that what was not publicly revealed could be 
even more severe, was virtually certain that one hedge fund’s failure 
could bring down the entire financial system.259 Ultimately, the Fed-
orchestrated bailout pooled capital injections from fourteen major banks 
that were indifferent to LTCM’s failure yet participated in trepidation of 
losing their own assets.260 
Another source of hedge fund-imposed systemic risk arises from the 
inherent disconnect in the funds’ un-governed relationships with the 
shareholders of the companies with whom hedge funds invest and 
transact.261 The sheer size of the investments that hedge funds make 
affects the prices of companies’ securities.262 Here, the fate of these 
unsophisticated investors is partially and indirectly dependent on the 
actions of the hedge fund.263 To quantify this, consider an investor who, 
in July of 1998, invested $100,000 in a portfolio consisting of Barclays, 
Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, and Merrill Lynch: banks with solid 
performances but which would, unbeknownst to the investor, participate 
in the LTCM bailout in September of 1998. About one week after the 
announcement of the LTCM bailout, the value of that portfolio would 
have dropped, on average, by 56%. In other words, due to the reckless 
decisions that LTCM made, the unsophisticated investor, through its 
investment in companies that invested in and transacted with LTCM, saw 
the value of its portfolio drop precipitously over a span of about two 
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months from $100,000 to just $44,000. To further exemplify the systemic 
implications, imagine that due to the losses that the unsophisticated 
investor sustained, it will soon be unable to meet its mortgage obligations 
or car payments. Obviously, one individual’s inability to pay its debts 
would hardly make a dent in the stability of the financial system but when 
it is thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of insolvent debtors, the 
systemic impact cannot be ignored. 
B. THE INFORMATION DISCLOSED TO THE MARKET IS INSUFFICIENT 
1. Long-only Public Disclosure is Misleading 
Among the many shortcomings of the current 13F long-only public 
disclosure regime is the inability to effectively use the information that is 
disclosed. This stems largely from the fact that the list of reportable 
securities under 13F is glaringly outdated. As it stands today, the long-
only public disclosure distorts market perceptions when it is not 
accompanied by the disclosure of short positions. Form PF is more 
comprehensive in this regard, but the information disclosed there is kept 
confidential. 
New investment vehicles and investment strategies are created all the 
time as financial market participants constantly seek out the next big 
profit-generating machine. Nevertheless, the list of reportable securities 
under 13F has not changed since its enactment in 1975.264 The amount of 
innovation and creativity with regard to investment vehicles has changed 
drastically. For example, the credit default swap was not invented until 
1994,265 the first collateralized debt obligation was not issued until 
1987,266 and merger arbitrage did not become a widely used strategy until 
the 1980s.267 Also excluded from the list of reportable securities are 
options contracts and mutual fund shares.268 Accordingly, the strategies 
and investment vehicles that hedge funds use are wholly unaccounted for 
in the public information set. 
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The usefulness of the information regarding hedge fund investment 
strategies that is publicly disclosed is drastically diminished absent a 
complete picture of the corresponding short positions. Such limited 
disclosure is misleading in three scenarios: first, a hedge fund could be 
taking a speculative short position against a stock; second, a hedge fund 
could be hedging a long position with a corresponding short position; and 
third, a hedge fund could be hedging a short position with a corresponding 
long position. 
The first scenario is rather simple: given that it is only a short 
position, it will never be publicly disclosed under the current 13F regime. 
Consider, for example, a scenario where a hedge fund or group of hedge 
funds have utilized their resources to discover that all Apple products 
have been manufactured with a toxic level of lead, but Apple is either 
unaware of this fact, or is aware but has yet to disclose this information 
publicly. In this case, the hedge fund will surely short a large portion of 
Apple’s stock, as it anticipates that the release of the news will cause the 
stock price to plummet. However, the lowly individual investor is entirely 
unaware of this impending crash, and happily invests their life savings 
into Apple stock. Six months later when the information is released, 
Apple’s stock crashes, the hedge fund profits, and the individual investor 
is left with nothing. 
The second scenario is typical of the most widely used strategy by 
hedge funds—the equity long/short—as well as pairs trading. Take, for 
example, a hedge fund that buys shares in the NASDAQ-100 Technology 
Sector Index, which is a basket of 100 of the world’s largest technology 
companies, and correspondingly sells short shares of Apple. Here, the 
hedge fund, through its sophisticated research, believes that the 
technology sector is on the rise, but wants to hedge against that bet by 
shorting Apple, the largest stock in the index. The 13F disclosure would 
send a signal to the market that hedge funds are extremely bullish on the 
technology sector. What those investors would not know, however, is that 
the hedge fund is not as confident as the disclosure suggests because it 
recognized a possible downside risk, and thus, hedged its position by 
shorting Apple’s stock. 
The third scenario is arguably the most distortive. Take, for example, 
a scenario where a hedge fund has reason to believe that Apple’s stock is 
going to plummet, so it short sells a large amount of Apple’s stock, and 
hedges that bet with a small long position in Microsoft’s stock. This hedge 
fund position would be referred to as “net short.” The public disclosure in 
this case would merely send the signal that hedge funds are somewhat 
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bullish on Microsoft’s stock. Here, the public would never know that the 
true trade was actually a pessimistic view on Apple. As one commentator 
put it, “You’ve kind of taken the hedge out of the hedge fund strategy if 
you don’t know what these funds are shorting . . . [y]ou’ve got less than 
half the puzzle.”269 
2. The Limited Resources of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
There is no question that the resources of the SEC are limited; it 
simply cannot police every transaction, analyze every data point, and 
catch every fraud related to securities. However, the SEC’s resources are 
so limited that they diminish the utility of 13F filings. In 2010, the SEC’s 
Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) released a review of the significant 
shortcomings on the part of the SEC with regards to administering and 
supervising the filings.270 
The report found that no division or office was individually or 
specifically responsible for reviewing the 13F filings.271 As one could 
expect, this resulted in no division or office prioritizing the review of 13F 
filings, resulting in the data being “less useful and reliable than Congress 
had intended.”272 In fact, the report found numerous instances where 
members of the general public notified the SEC of noncompliance in 
some filers’ forms.273 Some of the notifications involved glaringly 
obvious errors: for instance, a graduate student informed the SEC of a 
filer who continued to submit the filing in paper format, despite an online 
EDGAR form being available since 1999.274 In that case, the filer had 
never been informed of the error,275 which might suggest that those filings 
were never reviewed by the SEC at all. The fact that as of 2013, the SEC 
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has only brought one enforcement action against a 13F filer is yet another 
indication of the SEC’s ineffectiveness.276 
Confidential treatment requests have also been disregarded, lost or 
misplaced, and in some cases improperly revealed to the public. To 
conduct a review of the SEC’s handling of confidential treatment 
requests, the OIG requested a random sample of twenty-five documents 
from the SEC’s Investment Branch (“IM”) and Records Management 
Branch (“RM”), two entities that retain, process, and share confidential 
treatment requests.277 Alarmingly, neither IM nor RM could locate or even 
account for twelve of the twenty-five requested documents.278 The OIG 
verified that for six of those missing documents, the corresponding 
confidential treatment requests were approved despite no existing record 
supporting the approval decision.279 The OIG concluded that the SEC’s 
blatant failure to comply with its record retention procedures for 
confidential treatment filings raises serious concerns that those filings 
could be misplaced, lost, or even inadvertently disclosed.280 
The SEC also lacks the technology to review the wealth of 13F 
filings. Due to budgeting constraints and superseding priorities, the SEC 
cannot compete with the private sector in terms of technological 
prowess.281 Hedge funds certainly have better technology, part of which 
they expend on generating these reports, yet the SEC has proven to be 
unable to effectively handle such a large amount of information.282 
Confessedly, the SEC stated in 2011 that it “will not have sufficient 
capacity in the near or long term to conduct effective examinations of 
registered investment advisers with adequate frequency.”283 The SEC then 
suggested that more funding would be needed, and that funding would 
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have to grow as the number of registered investment advisers increases 
over time.284 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR EXPANDING THE LIST OF REPORTABLE 
SECURITIES UNDER FORM 13F TO INCLUDE BOTH LONG POSITIONS 
AND SHORT POSITIONS 
Despite hedge funds’ widespread growth and popularity, and their 
recognition by market actors, regulators, and academics as systemically 
influential institutions, little has been done to learn more about the 
implications that their practices have on the financial system.285 The 
current disclosure regime does little to inform the public or the SEC about 
these implications. Short selling is at the core of virtually every hedge 
fund strategy, yet the current disclosure obligations only require long 
position disclosure.286 The omission of public short position disclosure 
has rendered investors, corporations, and the market as a whole 
vulnerable to manipulation and the resultant harms of systemic risk. 
Ultimately, the lack of transparency in the market has led to inefficient 
capital allocation and price discovery, and a suboptimal level of liquidity. 
Therefore, 13F has unquestionably failed to accomplish the purpose that 
it was designed to achieve. To remedy these issues, the list of reportable 
securities under Form 13F should be expanded to include both long 
positions and short positions. 
Specifically, Form 13F should be expanded to include short positions 
as they are defined in EU 236: any transaction entered into by a hedge 
fund where the hedge fund receives a financial benefit from the decrease 
in price or value of the security. This would include traditional equity-
based short selling, as well as derivatives positions that result in a net 
short position. To be clear, the short position should be viewed in isolation 
and not in conjunction with or netted against a corresponding or 
associated long position. The reporting periods should remain as within 
forty-five days of the end of the most recent quarter, and should apply to 
those advisers whose funds hold an aggregate fair market value of at least 
$100,000,000. The value of each individual short position should be 
calculated by the greater of the value of the security on the date the short 
position was made (i.e., on the day an equity security was borrowed and 
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sold short) and the total value of short exposure on the short position on 
the last day of the most recent quarter. No event-driven threshold 
framework, such as the one in EU 236, should be adopted under 13F. 
Confidential treatment should still be available; however, there should be 
increased penalties for frivolous filings. 
Such an expansion would be easy to implement and would single-
handedly allow 13F to achieve its ultimate purpose. First, investors will 
benefit from a reduction in informational asymmetry and an elimination 
of the distorted picture painted by the current publicly available 
information set. Second, investors and corporations will no longer be 
susceptible to those manipulative short selling practices that exist purely 
because of the current one-sided 13F disclosure regime. Third, the 
systemic risks perpetuated by today’s 13F disclosure will be drastically 
reduced by a more transparent and comprehensive disclosure mandate. 
Fourth, a disclosure expansion will act to curb and even work around the 
limitations of the SEC and its resources. Finally, to the extent that 
disclosure reveals trading strategies, the proposal put forth in this Article 
would ensure that hedge funds do not lose profit opportunities as a result 
of disclosure. 
The burden on hedge fund advisers to file a 13F disclosure would 
increase only marginally, with the bulk of the burden coming from filing 
more confidential treatment requests. However, the compliance burden is 
outweighed by the benefits to investors, the public, and the market. After 
all, disclosure is a reasonable cost to pay to operate in an efficient market 
that is well-regulated and provides protections for its investors and issuers 
alike.287 Information regarding assets managed, leverage employed, fund 
performance, long positions, short positions, and much more is already 
filed in Form PF. Accordingly, merely adding short positions to 13F 
would be simple and inexpensive. This Article does not argue for the 
adoption of the EU’s threshold reporting approach because, among other 
reasons, it would drastically increase the compliance burden on managers, 
as they would need to constantly keep track of their holdings and fickle 
changes in their net short positions due to market fluctuations. Likewise, 
the EU’s threshold reporting framework is event-driven, which requires 
hedge funds to report short position changes as often as every day. A 
periodic, quarterly disclosure mandate will better serve to limit the 
compliance burden levied upon filers. 
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A. REDUCED INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND MANIPULATION 
The SEC has opined that every investor and market participant 
“deserve[s] equal access to information.”288 Disclosure is an effective tool 
to ensure equal access and reduce informational asymmetry. With no 
disclosure, or inadequate disclosure, individual investors are simply 
incapable of bearing the costs of fully assessing the relevant risks in order 
to invest efficiently. It can be argued that it is somewhat unfair for 
institutions like hedge funds, which use their expensive and time 
consuming resources to gather the necessary information, to have to 
disclose their findings to the public for free. However, without such 
disclosure, those investors without the requisite resources would not 
invest in the market because it would be impossible to compete with 
hedge funds for those opportunities for positive returns. Therefore, it 
would be in the hedge funds’ best interest to be subject to mandatory 
disclosures so as to avoid market illiquidity and inefficiency, and thereby 
increase trading opportunities. 
Short sale reporting would eliminate the skewed and misleading 
nature of the long-only disclosure regime. Short selling is an essential part 
of hedge fund trading. Hedge funds utilize short selling as a hedging 
mechanism to reduce risk, and a leverage mechanism to magnify 
returns.289 Nevertheless, a 13F disclosure today would only provide 
information regarding long positions. An unhedged speculative short 
position would not appear in the disclosure at all, a net long position 
would convey an inaccurate level of optimism, and a net short position 
would appear as merely a small bullish investment on a particular stock. 
At worst, this distortion ultimately discourages investors from 
participating in the markets, and at best, decreases the usefulness of the 
long-only Form 13F; thus, the justifications regarding imposing costs on 
hedge funds to file it are severely undermined. 
A mandatory short-and-long disclosure regime could allow the 
market to better assess the short selling impetus by revealing the identity 
of short sellers who may have ulterior motives other than an apparent 
desire to optimize price discovery. With disclosure of short positions, the 
market can better assess the intentions of the short sellers. With no short 
disclosures, investors are left to blindly assume that because a stock’s 
short interest increases, its price must be overvalued. However, in a short-
disclosure regime, market participants can see who is shorting a 
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company’s stock, which will allow them to make their own assumptions 
as to the motivations behind the short sales. Rather than a signal of 
overvaluation, perhaps those hedge funds that sold a stock short had an 
economic self-interest in the share price dropping. A comprehensive 
disclosure would provide investors with the facts to assess these 
misaligned interests and act accordingly. 
By adding short positions to 13F disclosures, some of the 
manipulative practices that exploit the current long-only disclosure 
regime would be severely disincentivized. Today, schemes like the “short 
and distort” strategy, predatory trading, and manipulative short selling 
leading up to an SEO unfairly ravage the coffers of targeted corporations. 
The most egregious part of these schemes is that hedge funds are able to 
carry them out with impunity by using short positions that never have to 
be disclosed. A more comprehensive 13F regime could provide a tool 
both for those targeted corporations and for market watchdogs to identify 
such manipulations. For example, the enhanced disclosure would expose 
a collusive scheme by a group of hedge funds to short one stock at the 
same time. Interestingly, in the Lehman Brothers example from Part II,290 
Lehman suspected that the false rumors were promulgated by short sellers 
who had an economic interest in the stock. It stands to reason that a long-
and-short disclosure regime would have pierced the veil protecting the 
anonymity of those short sellers, and could have revealed intentions 
incongruent with traditional market practices or even served as evidence 
of collusion. 
One study sought to explore the possibility of mandatory short 
disclosure being used as a coordination mechanism for manipulative short 
sellers.291 The study looked at the effects of companies in the EU’s new 
long-and-short disclosure regime and found that disclosure of a short 
position in a certain stock significantly increased the possibility of another 
short disclosure.292 The risk of short disclosures being used as a 
coordination mechanism would be significantly reduced under this 
Article’s proposal for two reasons. First, reporting would be quarterly and 
not event-driven like under the EU 236. With quarterly disclosure, a 
disclosed short position could be months or even more than a year old if 
it was granted confidential treatment. Accordingly, the reasons for the 
adoption of the short position are likely to be outdated, thereby reducing 
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the likelihood of a short seller mimicking a prior disclosure. Second, the 
identity of the short sellers would be revealed to the public. Surely, a short 
seller would be foolish to try to carry out any form of coordinated 
manipulation if their identity and exact positions are in the public domain. 
Potential harm to corporations and hedge funds from the disclosure 
of short positions could result from the corporations retaliating against the 
hedge fund that disclosed its short positions in their stock.293 In this case, 
those corporations may cease communicating with those who short their 
stock, or even use the media to launch attacks against the hedge fund.294 
This could potentially limit a hedge fund’s motivation to take a given 
short position, leading to market inefficiencies. However, the disclosure 
of short positions could also facilitate a conversation between the 
corporation and the hedge fund that shorted its stock.295 Without public 
disclosure of short positions, corporations’ market values are depressed 
by short positions, and they have little recourse to speak with the short 
sellers to identify their concerns.296 Corporations would be in a situation 
to analyze the perceptions, whether true or false, about their securities, 
and act to eliminate their perceived shortcomings.297 Conversely, hedge 
funds would be less hesitant to take short positions and overall market 
efficiency would be improved, not hindered. 
An expanded 13F regime would also significantly reduce the harm 
to companies and investors caused by voluntary disclosure manipulation. 
In a disclosure regime where short positions are not required to be 
reported, the voluntary disclosure of a short position through, say, the 
media will have an abnormal impact on the performance of a stock. If 
short disclosure were mandatory, this window for manipulation would be 
minimized because the revelation of a short position would be the status 
quo. For example, if Kerrisdale Capital’s short position of Zafgen Inc. had 
been disclosed in a mandatory short position regime, 13F filings would 
have shown a vast number of other hedge funds that had the same short 
position, or alternatively, the filings would have shown that no other 
hedge funds had shorted Zafgen. Either way, the short position disclosure 
by one hedge fund would be much less impactful in a mandatory short 
position public disclosure regime. 
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B. MITIGATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 
Hedge funds and their strategies contribute to systemic risk, and that 
risk is only amplified by the current disclosure regime that fails to fully 
gather information on the short position exposure on the market. While 
commentators quarrel as to the degree to which hedge funds contribute to 
systemic risk, few, if any, argue that hedge funds are not systemically 
important at all.298 The difficulty in measuring hedge funds’ contribution 
to systemic risk can largely be attributed to having too little information 
about hedge funds, their strategies, and the identity of their counterparties. 
The information that is disclosed publicly is too incomplete to be of value. 
The information that is disclosed only to the SEC would help measure 
hedge fund-generated systemic risk, but its utility is diminished since it 
remains hidden from the public eye. Such uncertainty perpetuates 
systemic risk. Simply put, to understand and thus reduce hedge funds’ 
contribution to systemic risk, more information must be publicly 
disclosed, and that information must be tailored to hedge funds and their 
unique strategies. 
Researchers can trace some of hedge funds’ actions and the effects 
of those actions, but their findings are limited by what is publicly 
disclosed. One research initiative sought to estimate the spillover 
effects—when an event or action in one market spills over and affects 
another market— of various hedge fund strategies and practices.299 The 
initiative employed a model that was able to calculate the statistical 
relationships between markets, but it was unable to explain the economic 
relationships underlying the statistical relationships.300 According to the 
researchers, the economic drivers of the statistical relationships could 
only be determined if there was more information on the hedge funds’ 
counterparty exposure, assets, and liabilities.301 While statistical analysis 
is useful in many respects, it falls short in the measurement of hedge fund 
generated systemic risk. 
                                                                                                                 
 298. See Ashworth II, supra note 23, at 670-71; Kehoe, supra note 157; Lewis, supra 
note 23; Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., Credit Crisis, supra note 5; COAL. OF PRIVATE INV. 
COS., Facts About Hedge Funds, supra note 22; Coal. of Private Inv. Cos., Setting Policy, 
supra note 1, at 3; Gropp, supra note 247. 
 299. See Gropp, supra note 247. 
 300. See id. 
 301. See id. 
2017]   IF YOU ONLY KNEW THE POWER OF THE DARK SIDE 379 
The proposed 13F regime will result in more information being 
publicly disclosed to the market by increasing the amount of 13F filers. 
Intuitively, with more 13F filers comes more information. To accomplish 
this, the proposal does not adopt the EU 236 net short threshold. As a 
result, all short positions must be disclosed, irrespective of the size or 
percentage change in value of the position. One could argue, however, 
that the disclosure of miniscule short positions could trigger a market 
reaction that is disproportionately large in relation to the value of the short 
position.302 Moreover, one could argue that it would be unduly 
burdensome to require hedge funds to calculate and report the values of 
these small short positions. Nevertheless, this Article takes the position 
that any additional burden or disproportionate market reaction is 
outweighed by the benefits of more public information in the market. 
With more information publicly available, the proposed 13F regime 
will result in increased market transparency. More transparency will 
enhance the beneficial effects while at the same time debasing the 
detrimental effects of 13F disclosures. As the beneficial effects pertain to 
systemic risk, the market and its investors, issuers, and regulators will all 
have a wealth of balanced information to tackle systemic risk. Those 
systemic risks that already exist will be more easily identified, and 
potential sources of new systemic risk can be avoided. Indeed, the 
imposition of 13F filing burdens on hedge funds is more justifiable when 
the disclosure results in the mitigation of, not contribution to, systemic 
risk. 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S 
LIMITED RESOURCES 
It would be physically impossible and an inefficient use of resources 
for the SEC to examine and analyze each long and short position for the 
well over 10,000 13Fs filed each quarter. The SEC has demonstrated an 
inability to police each and every filer and filing.303 However, that is how 
the United States government has approached essentially every policing 
function. The Internal Revenue Service does not audit every tax filing, the 
Food and Drug Administration does not inspect every single label for 
compliance, and the police departments do not arrest everyone who 
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commits a crime. The reason for this, primarily, is that a sufficient 
deterrence effect can be generated with randomized monitoring.304 
Accordingly, the SEC need not expend its limited resources to achieve 
100% noncompliance detection. 
Moreover, while the SEC can surely fortify its administration and 
handling of 13F filings, it should not be stripped of the responsibility 
altogether. If nothing else, the SEC plays an integral role in the public 
disclosure process by serving as a centralized body for filing and 
reviewing 13F filings. Without a uniform public disclosure standard, 13F 
would be rendered utterly useless. 
With that being said, calls for hedge funds to provide more 
information to the SEC on a confidential basis305 are misplaced. Any 
attempt to receive even an incremental benefit from feeding more 
information into an entity that is already overburdened would be futile. 
The information provided by Form PF is comprehensive and sufficient to 
analyze and understand hedge funds’ contribution to systemic risk. 
However, the SEC cannot be held responsible for managing that risk 
themselves. While it is very important for regulators to have access to that 
information, it is merely half the formula for achieving a fully 
functioning, liquid, and efficient market. Such information, in one form 
or another, needs to be disclosed to the public. 
Members of the public can, as they have before, report to the SEC 
when they find instances of noncompliant filings. This crowdsourcing 
approach is certainly more efficient than the SEC bearing all the 
responsibility. Members of the public will continue to report these 
instances because they stand to gain when a counterparty or entity in 
which they have an economic interest does not disclose their positions 
properly. The SEC can, as it has been doing, decide whether or not to 
pursue those noncompliant filers. With the advent of twenty-first century 
instantaneous media coverage, filers themselves are already incentivized 
to file properly as reputational risk can be very damaging. 
If short positions are included in 13F filings, there will be more 
reasons for hedge fund advisers to seek confidential treatment. The fact 
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that the SEC’s resources are already extended beyond its capacity begs 
the question of how it will deal with more confidential treatment requests. 
This ripens the opportunity for confidential treatment manipulation. To 
remedy this, the penalties for frivolous confidential treatment filings must 
be harsh. In effect, heightened penalties will deter those attempts to 
exploit de facto confidential treatment during the time it takes the SEC to 
review the request. 
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING HEDGE FUNDS’ PROPRIETARY 
INFORMATION 
Hedge funds go to great lengths to protect the secrecy of their 
investment strategies, and rightly so. Hedge funds employ enormous 
amounts of capital to develop these strategies, and thus, the opacity in 
which hedge funds operate is justifiable. However, hedge funds do avail 
themselves of the benefits and protections of the regulated markets in 
which they participate. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to mandate 
hedge fund disclosure to ensure and increase the liquidity, efficiency, 
price discovery, and capital allocation in the markets.306 Nevertheless, a 
balance must be struck between disclosure for the good of the market and 
the protection of proprietary trading strategies. 
To reach this equilibrium, this Article utilizes three tools: a periodic 
reporting framework, a forty-five day “buffer” period, and confidential 
treatment requests. The periodic reporting periods provide a better 
solution than the EU 236 event-driven framework. With EU 236, changes 
in short positions could occur multiple times a day as prices fluctuate. 
This could trigger a reporting obligation every day, which makes hedge 
funds more vulnerable to copycat investors who mimic their strategies 
and thus diminish their potential returns. Conversely, quarterly reporting 
with a forty-five day buffer period results in fewer obligations per year, 
and renders hedge funds’ potential profits less susceptible to being 
usurped by copycat investors. Such a delay in reporting allows hedge 
funds more time to generate information regarding their trades and adjust 
their positions before public revelation. More likely than not, the trade 
would already have been entered into and exited from before it must be 
disclosed; thus, all profit opportunities would have already been realized 
by the hedge fund.307 
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Despite the poor handling and the delayed response time caused by 
the SEC’s limited resources, confidential treatment requests remain an 
important part of protecting hedge funds from losing profits as a result of 
disclosing their various positions. For those strategies that involve an 
implementation or investment period that exceeds the buffer period, 
which could be as little as forty-five days and as much as 135 days, the 
confidential treatment request will provide protection from lost profits.308 
And as mentioned above, an increase in penalties for those confidential 
treatment requests deemed frivolous will deter abuse of the de facto 
confidential treatment during the period between filing and approval or 
denial of the request.309 
CONCLUSION 
As evidenced, the current 13F mandated long-only public disclosure 
regime is severely ineffective and the benefits reaped from the 
information disclosure hardly justify the compliance costs imposed on 
hedge fund filers. The regime can be likened to reporting the score of a 
football game by disclosing only one team’s score. While some 
information and associated benefits can be gleaned from one-sided 
reporting, a more balanced two-sided disclosure mandate would benefit 
all market participants exponentially. The increased transparency 
resulting from a 13F expansion would eliminate informational 
asymmetry, minimize opportunities for manipulation, and reduce 
systemic risk, all while taking into account the limited resources of the 
SEC and the possibility of lost profits from the disclosure of trading 
positions. Irrefutably, the realization of such benefits will result in a 
market and financial system that is more liquid and efficient, with more 
accurate pricing and effective capital allocation. 
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